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The General Theory of Behavioral Pricing: 
Applying Complexity Theory to Incorporate 
Heterogeneity and Achieve High-Predictive Validity 
Abstract 
Building behavioral-pricing models-in-contexts enrich one or more goals of science and 
practice:  description, understanding, prediction, and influence/control.  The general theory of 
behavioral strategy includes a set of propositions that describe alternative configurations of 
decision processes and objectives, contextual features, and beliefs/assessments associating with 
different outcomes involving specific price-points.   This article explicates the propositions and 
discusses empirical studies which support the general theory.  The empirical studies include the 
use of alternative data collection and analytically tools including true field experiments, think 
aloud methods, long interviews, ethnographic decision tree modeling, and building and testing 
algorithms (e.g., qualitative comparative analysis).  The general theory of behavioral pricing 
involves the blending cognitive science, economics, marketing, psychology, and implemented 
practices in explicit contexts.  Consequently, behavioral pricing theory is distinct from context-
free microeconomics, market-driven, and competitor-only price-setting.  Capturing and reporting 
contextually-driven alternative routines to price setting by a compelling set of propositions 
represents what is particularly new and valuable about the general theory.  The general theory 
serves as a useful foundation for advances in theory and improving pricing practice. 




Strategy theory has converged on a view that the crucial problem in strategic 
management is firm heterogeneity—why firms adopt different strategies and 
structures, why heterogeneity persists, and why competitors perform differently. 
(Powell, Lovallo, & Fox, 2011, p. 1370) 
Powell et al. (2011, p. 1371) go on to define “behavioral strategy” as follows: 
“Behavioral strategy merges cognitive and social psychology with strategic management theory 
and practice. Behavioral strategy aims to bring realistic assumptions about human cognition, 
emotions, and social behavior to the strategic management of organizations and, thereby, to 
enrich strategy theory, empirical research, and real-world practice.”  “Merges” is the operative 
word for describing, understanding, predicting, and influencing behavioral strategy and its sub-
fields including behavioral pricing.   
The focus on capturing heterogeneity, realistic assumptions, and the centrality of the 
merging proposition builds from the behavioral theory of the firm’s viewing that organizations 
comprise differentiated subunits with conflicting goals, resources, and time horizons (Cyert and 
March, 1963).  Marketing, pricing, and organizational buying strategies are largely political 
processes within specific contexts involving coalition building, bargaining, and conflict 
resolution among representatives of differentiated subunits with conflicting goals, resources, and 
time horizons (Cyert and March, 1963; Pettigrew, 1974).  
However, while including strategy as a political process, behavioral pricing theory goes 
beyond this perspective to include cognitive science theory and findings especially on how 
executives transform information into knowledge and how they create and apply highly useful 
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algorithms (i.e., rules on how-to-decide usually leading to desirable outcomes) in selecting 
choices outcomes (e.g., specific price-points and increases/decreases in prices).  Examples of 
such cognitive science advances in behavioral pricing in business-to-business contexts include 
the studies by Morgenroth (1964), Howard and Morgenroth (1968), Joskow (1973), Woodside 
and Wilson (2000), and Woodside (2003).  These B2B studies and additional studies in business-
to-consumer contexts (e.g., Woodside, Schpektor, and Xia, 2013) support the conclusion that the 
general theory of behavioral pricing is an insightful and useful blending of cognitive science, 
economics, marketing, psychology, and implemented practices in explicit contexts.    
The core contributions of the present study and the general theory of behavioral pricing 
include explicating and solving the principal dilemma for advancing theory and research on 
behavioral pricing—that is, the need to generalize beyond the individual case and the need for 
specificity (reporting the nitty-gritty details necessary for deep understanding that captures the 
requisite complexity/heterogeneity within the individual case.  Solving the dilemma includes 
embracing several steps possible but rarely taken-in-combination in pricing research; these steps 
include going into the field to perform “direct research” (Mintzberg, 1979), embracing the major 
tenets of complexity theory (Byrne, 1998, 2005; Urry, 2005).  The major tenets of complexity 
theory includes the proposition that that multiple paths lead to the same outcome/price, that is, 
“equifinality” occurs—alternative asymmetric combinations of indicators (i.e., algorithms) are 
sufficient but no one combination is necessary for predicting the occurrence of a specific pricing 
decision, and causal asymmetry occurs, that is, indicator configural models that accurately 
predict a high price-point are not the mirror opposites of the indicator configural models that 
accurately predict a low price-point.   
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Another complexity theory proposition is that, “Relationships between variables can be 
non-linear with abrupt switches occurring, so the same “cause” can, in specific circumstances, 
produce different effects.  (“The Complexity Turn,” Urry, 2005, p. 4).  Thus, an increase in 
customer demand may be an outcome of a price increase “in specific circumstances [contexts]” 
and an increase in demand may be an outcome of a price decrease in other specific contexts.  The 
same point is relevant for demand decreases and price increases and decreases.  The general 
theory of behavioral pricing includes explicating the specific contexts for the occurrence of all 
four price-demand relationships:  demand increases associating with price increases and 
decreases and demand decreases associating with price increases and decreases.   
The complexity turn to behavioral pricing practice and theory includes the tipping-point 
tenet as Urry (2005) and Gladwell (2002) describe.   
Moreover, if a system passes a particular threshold with minor changes in the 
controlling variables, switches occur such that a liquid turns into a gas, a large 
number of apathetic people suddenly tip into a forceful movement for change 
(Gladwell, 2002).  Such tipping points give rise to unexpected structures and 
events whose properties can be different form the underlying elementary laws.  
(Urry, 2005, p. 5). 
In behavioral pricing models such tipping points frequently involve replacing a negative 
with a positive response to one issue in string (path) of questions within a given complex 
configuration of antecedent conditions.  Examples of such “causal complexity” (Ragin, 2000) 
appear in empirical examples later in the present study. 
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Following this introduction, section two presents the general theory of behavior pricing in 
the form of the theory’s major tenets and by illustrating applications of these tenets in industrial 
marketing and B2B-service contexts.  Section three describes alternative-to-complementary 
research methods useful for examining the tenets of the general theory and advancing new tenets.  
Section four concludes with implications for the strategist’s workbench in thinking about 
creating pricing algorithms that are useful in specific contexts. 
THE GENERAL THEORY OF BEHAVIOR PRICING 
Three major objectives of the general theory include capturing heterogeneity of pricing 
decisions by marketers and responses to pricing decisions by customers; building isomorphic 
models of information-in-use within real-life contexts—of marketing and customer organizations 
participating in price-setting and price-responding (customer price-responses include evaluating, 
negotiating, and accepting/rejecting proposal and specific price-points of a vendor); and 
achieving high predictive validity (accuracy) that includes highly accurate predictions via 
heuristics-in-use by the vendor and the customer in deciding issues relating to setting and 
accepting/rejecting products/services at different price-points.   
Not all pricing researchers value these objectives highly; Joskow (1973) points out that 
varied criticisms have been made of attempts to construct models of actual decision-making 
processes. Friedman (1966) argues that it is not a function of economic theory to recreate the real 
world, but to construct theoretical paradigms that predict well.  Joskow (1973) responds to 
Friedman’s perspective with evidence that current (i.e., symmetric-based) models of regulated 
firms do not predict pricing behavior very well. “In addition, the value of ‘as if’ models declines 
as we not only become interested in predicting how firms behave given current structural 
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interrelationships, but begin to ask questions about structural changes aimed at changing the 
nature of firm responses. For those interested in public policy analysis regarding regulated 
[utility] industries, a more detailed understanding of firm decision processes, decision processes 
of regulatory agencies, and their interrelationship appears to be in order” (Joskow 1973, pp. 119-
120).  This behavioral theory perspective is relevant for less regulated industries as well—a more 
detailed understanding is necessary (that is now lacking) of firm pricing-decision processes, 
customers’ decision processes in evaluating and responding to marketers’ responses to RFQs 
(request for quotation), and the subsequent process-dynamics—and final prices points offered 
and accepted/rejected.   
In his data collection during 1970-1971 on advancing a behavioral theory of pricing in 
highly regulated firms, Joskow (1972, 1973) did manage to take the necessary step of doing 
direct research but his data analysis is limited to symmetric testing via regression modeling.  The 
idea of testing for sufficient but not necessary outcomes via algorithm modeling was advocated 
more than two decades later by McClelland (1998) and advanced substantially by Charles Ragin 
in several publications including his masterwork, Redesigning Social Inquiry, 2008).  
Asymmetric theory and analysis of Joskow’s (1972) behavioral pricing data awaits doing.  
However, Joskow (2015) reports that his Ph.D. dissertation (Joskow 1972) does not include the 
data and the data are no longer available. 
Also unfortunately, the most in-depth, available, behavioral study of firms engaging (i.e., 
colluding illegally) in setting prices in a business-to-business industry (Eichenwald, 2001) does 
not provide details with respect to conversations and decisions regarding specific price-points or 
customers’ responses to the pricing decisions made by the colluding industrial (agricultural 
chemicals) marketers.   The development of such ethnographic pricing models using the price-
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collusion original data set awaits the researcher willing to wade into the court records and the 
FBI (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation) files—the individual multiple decision processes and 
outcomes to these processes that are available over a five-year period represent the data for such 
a study.  Such research on decision processes of price setting and changes in B2B contexts is 
available rarely and only partially (e.g., Morgenroth, 1965; Howard and Morgenroth, 1968; 
Woodside and Wilson, 2000). 
To capture heterogeneity, the general theory of behavioral pricing does not rely alone on 
the use of written surveys with fixed-point scales and symmetric statistical tests of observable 
choices by vendors and customers but includes “direct research” (Mintzberg, 1979) ethnographic 
tools to record tacit knowledge and cognitive processes preceding the observable choices.  These 
ethnographic tools include participant observation, applications of the think aloud method, 
historical analysis of documents, and the long interview method (Gladwin, 1980,1982, 1983; 
McCracken, 1988; Woodside, 2010)—and the use of asymmetric tools such as reporting on the 
use/value of fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) as well as qualitative comparative 
analysis (Ragin, 2008).  Direct research is going physically into the context of study to observe, 
interview, and examine rather than rely principally on data from an internet, mail, or telephone 
survey that typically involves one executive responding per firm and less than 25 in 100 firms 
providing useable responses to the fixed-point scales items.  Direct research seeks confirmatory 
evidence from multiple sources having direct knowledge of processes and outcomes of thinking 
and actions of participants enacting behaviors of interest related to a given context or issue. 
While the core tenets of the general theory apply across B2B context and firms in 
different industries, the tenets’ presentations make use of findings from a specific industrial 
marketing and buying pricing study (e.g., Woodside and Wilson, 2000).  Taking a small step 
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toward generalization, the theory here describes how the tenets apply to a second study—a study 
on pricing petroleum at the wholesale level.  
The first study (Woodside and Wilson 2000) included multiple rounds of meetings of 
executives by the researchers at the marketing headquarters of a solvents manufacturer in 
Houston and long interviews, face-to-face, with four of the manufacturer’s customers; the 
customers interviewed were located in Cleveland, north-central Pennsylvania, and western South 
Carolina. Each customer interview was ninety minutes; customers were selected that filled 
certain profiles of interest in the study—configurations of customers with large versus small 
purchasing requirements for solvents and both aggressive and versus mannered customers; see 
Woodside and Wilson (2000) for additional details. 
Figure 1 is an “ethnographic decision tree model (EDTM)” (Gladwin, 1989) of the 
marketer's framing and point selection processes for four customers in the study and more than 
250 additional customers. EDTMs are suitable for linear programming and for use in testing the 
predictive accuracy of the algorithms appearing in subroutines in the model.  EDTMs are 
isomorphic representations of reality in the thinking and doing processes of pricing and 
responding to specific price-points. 
While being a complex, heterogeneous model, the thoughts and actions of the product 
managers and sales representatives in this firm are centered on asking a brief series of questions: 
how much business does the customer represent (box 2)? How does the customer frame key 
aspects of his/her firm's relationship with us and our competitors (boxes 3-7)? Which objectives 
should dominate our response to the customer's response to our proposal (boxes 15 and 16)? For 
example, if the customer firm is a key account (i.e. large business for the marketer) and the 
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customer insists on achieving a price reduction, the marketer is likely to respond with a 
“`creative proposal”' that includes: first, a low price; second, funding for storage equipment or 
related facilities at the customer's sites; and third, “price protection”' against price increases 
during some of the contract period. Whether or not such an outcome occurs depends on the 
marketer's belief that “preferred supplier participation” status was given to the marketer’s firm 
by from the customer—a euphemism for being awarded the largest share or 100 percent of the 
customer requirements for solvents. 
The following discussion covers the core tenets of the general theory of behavior pricing.  
While the discussion of each tenant refers to findings in the study by Woodside and Wilson 
(2000), these tenets are applicable and prevalent for nearly all pricing contexts in business and 
industrial marketing/purchasing contexts.  “High score” in the following discussion refers to a 
calibrated score in fuzzy or crisp set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA, see Ragin, 2008).  
All QCA calibrated scores range from 0.00 to 1.00.  Such calibrated scores indicate the degree of 
membership in a condition, for example, the score may indicate membership in “high price” with 
a score of 0.30 being a relatively low score in high price and a score of 0.95 equal to a score of 
“full membership” in high price.  From a practical as well as theoretical perspective, small to 
medium changes in fuzzy-set calibration reference-points rarely change the substantive impact of 
findings in studies using QCA (see additional details, see Ragin 2008; Woodside 2013).   
1.  A case (e.g., one specific price decision among 100+ decisions) with a high score in one 
antecedent condition is rarely sufficient in associating with a high or low outcome score 
(e.g., a high price-point).   
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A few specific combinations of two-plus antecedent conditions are sufficient in 
identifying with an outcome condition of particular interest (e.g., a high or low price-point) but 
not a single antecedent condition.  Consciously and/or unconsciously decision-makers (DMs) 
process two-plus antecedent conditions to reach a conclusion, decision, and action.   
For example, in Figure 1 the shortest path to an outcome involves asking and answering 
three questions.  In Figure 1 “cost reduction” is a B2B purchasing term that refers to seeking 
price decreases in purchasing requirements from a supplier; “cost avoidance” refers to seeking 
price increases less than the industry price inflation rate.  Cost reduction is a more aggressive 
stance some buyers assume than cost avoidance.  A “market price” stance is less aggressive than 
cost avoidance; willing to accept “list price” is the least aggressive purchasing stance. 
Figure 1 here. 
 Related to Figure 1, not all key account customers adopt a highly aggressive stance with 
respect to price. Consequently, a key account may or may not receive a low price quote or the 
lowest price quote.  A specific price-point in a response to an RFQ depends on the combination 
of two-plus antecedent conditions.  From the perspectives of data analysis and sensemaking, a 
discussion of net effects and relative sizes of net effects of independent variables provide limited 
usefulness in comparison to adopting a configural (i.e., recipe or combination) perspective.   
2.  Decision-makers rarely use all available information in all real-life cognitive processes.  
From a “property-space” (Lazarsfeld, 1937) perspective (i.e., identifying every 
theoretically possible combination of antecedent conditions) all configurations possible 
theoretically do not occur in practice or in behavioral pricing models.  For example, the marketer 
considers the aggressiveness of customers’ responses to price-points only for key account 
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customers.  The marketer rarely considers how aggressive the customer stands for non-key 
account customers (e.g., Figure 1 does not include such a path).   
Customer price-lowering aggressiveness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
customer to achieve the lowest priced point that the marketer is willing to offer.  See Figure 2.  
Such a necessary but not sufficient condition for lowering price provides valuable information 
for customers—being a large requirements (volume) customer who is willing to single-source a 
purchase requirement with a supplier is insufficient for achieving a high membership score in the 
outcome condition (i.e., a very low price), in addition such a customer needs to aggressively 
pursue a lower price.   
Figures 2 and 3 here. 
Using Boolean algebra, the following configuration identifies a “causal recipe” that is 
sufficient for the marketer to include a very-low price-point in the response to the RFQ:  K•S•A 
≥ 0.80, where K = key (large volume) customer account); S = willing to single-source; A = 
aggressively pursuing a price-lowering strategy.  The mid-level dot (“•”) represents the logical 
“and” condition in Boolean algebra.  A sideway tilde (“~”_represents negation or one minus the 
membership score, for example, ~S = 1 – S, and represents a membership score in not being 
willing to single-source.  The score equal to or greater than 0.80 indicates for this configuration 
that such customers have a high membership scores for all three of these antecedent conditions.   
For a complex antecedent statement (i.e., the combination of two plus simple antecedent 
conditions), the total score for the statement is equal to the lowest score among the scores in the 
configural statement.  Thus, a customer having the following scores, K = 1.00; S = 1.00; and A = 
0.80 would have a membership score equal to 0.80 for K•S•A.  See Figure 3 for an XY plot that 
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shows a pattern indicating high consistency—scores high on X associate with scores high on Y 
with the exception of one case—customer number 11.   
Woodside and Baxter (2013) describes contexts where a very limited number of 
customers do not fit the general pattern of findings in a study and how to create and test 
alternative models to explain such instances as case 11.  The note at the bottom of Figure 3 
describes additional information on case 11 and how to refine the model to account for similar 
cases. For nearly all individual cases with a configuration of high membership scores for the 
combination of all three antecedent conditions was sufficient for a very low price in the 
Woodside and Wilson (2000) study except for one customer firm.   This one customer firm (case 
11 in Figure 3) is a “contrarian case”.  A contrarian case is an individual (e.g., decision or firm) 
that has an outcome score opposite to a substantial majority of the cases with similar high scores 
on the antecedent condition.  The presence of contrarian cases means that a researcher needs to 
conduct “an elaborate dialogue of ideas and evidence that leads to a progressive refinement of 
understanding of the relevant cases and to a more nuanced elaboration of the relevant causal 
conditions” (Ragin, 2000, p. 1232).  Case 11 in Figure 3 was a super-aggressive customer in 
demanding additional add-on concessions that the industrial marketer labelled, “an asshole” (cf. 
van Maanen, 1978).  Adding the condition, “not an asshole” (i.e., ~H, where the sideways tilde 
indicates taking the negation and “H” stands for “asshole”) into the configural statement results 
in a shift to the far left of the XY plot for case 11 in Figure 11 and is a useful explanation as to 
why case 11 does not have a high outcome associated with the configural statement, K•S•A. 
3.  Decision-makers do not tradeoff high accuracy for low effort but create and use 
algorithms that are fast, frugal, and accurate/useful in achieving their objectives. 
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The suggestion implied by Powell, Lovallo, and Fox (2011) that individuals fail to do as 
well as they can do in deciding  and the proposition that DMs tradeoff high accuracy to achieve 
low effort (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1982) are inaccurate (see Gigerenzer and Brighton, 
2009, for evidence and a thorough discussion of these points).  Professional B2B marketers and 
buyers are able to create and use relatively simple heuristics to achieve high accuracy and enable 
these DMs to achieve their objectives more than is possible by using all the available information 
and statistical multivariate procedures.   
While individuals are limited in their conscious cognitive capacity, the available evidence 
does not support a conclusion of lower competence by decision makers following not using all 
the information available as symmetric tests as the following perspective implies: 
Research in behavioral decision theory (BDT) shows that individuals lack the 
cognitive capacity to make fully informed and unbiased decisions in complex 
environments (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Payne, Bettman, and 
Johnson, 1988). To cope with complex judgments and decisions, people use 
simplifying heuristics that are prone to systematic biases. Decision makers do not 
maximize the subjective expected utility of total wealth, but focus on deviations 
from cognitive reference points. BDT has found many applications in the social 
sciences, including strategic management (Bazerman and Moore, 2008).  (Powell, 
Lovallo, and Fox, 2011)  
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) provide an extensive review of compelling evidence that 
simple heuristics (i.e., simple algorithms) using limited amounts of information outperform the 
symmetric-based statistical models using all information available—when using holdout samples 
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to test for predictive validity.  They conclude, “Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that 
ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the 
study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve 
accuracy” (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009, p. 107). Morgenroth (1964) and Howard and 
Morgenroth (1968) describe the use of holdout samples for testing for predictive validity and the 
achievement of high predictive validity for algorithms in B2B pricing decisions. 
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) describe how, “In the 1970s, the term “heuristic” 
acquired a different connotation, undergoing a shift from being regarded as a method that makes 
computers smart to one that explains why people are not smart. Daniel Kahneman, Amos 
Tversky, and their collaborators published a series of experiments in which people’s reasoning 
was interpreted as exhibiting fallacies. ‘Heuristics and biases’ became one phrase. It was 
repeatedly emphasized that heuristics are sometimes good and sometimes bad, but virtually 
every experiment was designed to show that people violate a law of logic, probability, or some 
other standard of rationality… Another negative and substantial consequence was that 
computational models of heuristics, such as lexicographic rules (Fishburn, 1974) and 
elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972), became replaced by one-word labels: availability, 
representativeness, and anchoring. These were seen as the mind’s substitutes for rational 
cognitive procedures. By the end of the 20
th
 century, the use of heuristics became associated with 
shoddy mental software, generating three widespread misconceptions: (1) heuristics are always 
second-best; (2) we use heuristics only because of our cognitive limitations; (3) more 
information, more computation, and more time would always be better” (Gigerenzer and 
Brighton, 2009, p. 109). 
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Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) show how multiple regression analysis (MRA) and 
additional symmetric statistical tests outperform simple algorithms for fit validity but the 
opposite holds for predictive validity (via cross-validation with holdout samples).  In cross-
validation a model is fitted to one half of the data and tested on the other half and vice versa.  
Test of sufficiency models in industrial pricing context support the conclusion that simple 
heuristics provide high validity in predicting decision choices.  Given that the proof of a model’s 
worth lies in predictive validity, algorithm models such as the model appearing in Figure 1 need 
to be tested on fresh data—data not used in creating the model. 
In a behavioral-pricing research example, in a study creating and using simple heuristics 
in a B2B pricing context, Morgenroth (1964, p. 21) reported, “To determine its predictive 
accuracy [of the behavioral pricing model] fresh data were introduced into the [whole pricing 
algorithm] model. From a series of cabinets in the office of the division one file drawer in each 
cabinet was haphazardly chosen. The cabinets contained pricing data and decisions of the 
division over a six-year period. A systematic sample of every tenth filing was taken. The filings 
were arranged internally in chronological order, with the date that a competitor's move was 
initially made (the triggering) serving as the specific criterion of order. This sample yielded 32 
decisions which were compared with the decisions predicted by the model… Agreement existed 
in all cases tried. Hence the hypothesis that the model can predict the executive's decision was 
not disconfirmed by the tests.”   
Unfortunately, neither Morgenroth (1964) nor Woodside and Wilson (2000) provide a 
side-by-side comparison of MRA and QCA tests for predictive validity in B2B contexts.  
Woodside and Wilson (2000) also do not report testing for predictive validity using a holdout 
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(fresh) sample of customer cases.  Thus, the evidence supporting higher predictive validity for 
algorithms versus MRA models is not conclusive in the context of pricing in B2B contexts—but 
the studies by Gigerenzer and colleagues (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the 
ABC Research Group, 1999) offer consistent findings that algorithms created by biased minds 
provide more accurate models in predicting outcomes than the use of MRA and models that 
maximize subjective expected utility; additional field studies using both symmetric (e.g., MRA) 
and asymmetric tests (e.g., QCA) are necessary to confirm this claim.   
4.  Necessary but insufficient conditions (NBICs) are always present in behavioral pricing 
but often are unreported. 
Both marketers and buyers do not think to report on NBICs that researchers may find of 
great interest for advancing theory and practice.  NBICs include antecedents that appear in a 
limited number of branches in an ethnographic decision tree model such as the one appearing in 
Figure 1 as well as antecedents that pricing decision participants fail to mention and researchers 
fail to ask about.   
Information on both types of NBICs can be learned by asking participants to use “the 
think aloud method” (van Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 1994) in responding to different 
highly-relevant pricing scenario-problems. Such scenario-problems can be presented to 
participants in the form of paragraphs and/or choice and conjoint experiments.  In one instance of 
doing so, a buyer announced, “I would never buy from a supplier I never heard of.”  “Buyer 
awareness of the supplier” is a seemingly obvious NBIC that did not occur in the study before 
hearing this oral remark by a purchasing agent.   
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NBICs are often put forth explicitly in marketers’ and buyers’ documents and face-to-
face statements as well as appearing without warning in long interviews.  The second category of 
NBICs represents one form of “tacit knowledge” (Nonaka, 1994; Polyani 1958/2002).  Tacit 
knowledge is unconscious and semi-conscious beliefs—“the type of knowledge that you gain 
through personal experience of working in an organization, but that is not written down and is 
difficult to share” (FT Lexicon, 2013). 
 5.  Participants in setting price and responding to a price-point use neither equally 
weighted or unequally weighted conditions in compensatory rules when crafting a price-
point or responding to a price-point—marketers and buyers make use of conditional 
statements. 
Examples of the conditional statements with respect to price-points that marketers use 
appear in Figure 4 and below in Figure 7.  These conditional statements refer to specific contexts 
and require asymmetric, rather than symmetric, test of their efficacy, that is, for high 
sufficiency—whereby low outcome scores associate with both low and high outcome scores, 
only high scores on the path in the statement associates with a high score for the outcome 
condition.  A simple antecedent condition may have a statistically significant positive 
relationship with price for all cases while at the same time have a highly negative association 
with price for several individual cases.   
Consequently, the study of how participants weight the importance of simple antecedent 
conditions and whether or not a series of simple antecedent conditions each have a significant 
positive or negative influence on price is not very informative.  For example, the positive impact 
of customer aggressiveness on lowering price changes to an apparent negative impact if the 
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customer scores high on being an asshole.  Useful accurate interpreting of what is happening 
depends on focusing on multiple configurations (paths) of complex antecedent conditions. 
 Figure 4 includes the main paths (i.e., configurations or recipes) that appear in Figure 1.  
The findings in both Figures 1 and 4 illustrate the tenet that a marketer may apply price-
increasing and price-decreasing strategies for the same B2B product/service for different 
customers, strategies that do not depend exclusively on the buyers’ purchase quantities—the 
implementation of quantity discount sizes depends on the presence and absence of additional 
antecedents in the configurations. 
 6.  Average price increase or decrease across all customers provides insufficient 
information for advancing theory because price changes are contingent on several complex 
antecedent conditions—monthly or annual prices may increase on average for most 
customers but decrease for a substantial minority, while some customers receive the same 
price quote as one given last year. 
Figure 5 illustrates this sixth tenet for data from the Woodside and Wilson (2000 study—
not appearing in their 2000 report.   Figure 5 shows most customers receiving price increases of 
varying amounts contingent on the membership score of a combination of three antecedent 
conditions.  However, customers with high scores on all three antecedent conditions (location B 
in Figure 5) receive substantial price decreases.   
Figure 5 here. 
Customers knowing their configural location within such three- to five-sided dimensions 
are more likely to more able to create effective strategies to reduce price increases or even gain 
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price decreases than customers without such knowledge.  One strategy planning take-away is that 
an average price increase rarely applies to all customers.   
7.  Equifinality occurs: more than one configuration leads to the same solution (outcome), 
that is, a specific price-point. 
For example, several routes lead to outcomes 11 and 12 in Figure 1.  Behavioral pricing 
theory and research includes observations of usually two-to-five combinations of complex 
antecedent conditions that lead to the same outcome.  
The findings from the wholesale pricing study by Morgenroth (1964) and Howard and 
Morgenroth (1968) illustrate tenet 7 vividly.  Figure 6 summarizes their behavioral pricing model 
in an ethnographic decision tree diagram.  The model includes three outcomes:  an increase in 
price (top-third of Figure 6), a price decrease (bottom two-thirds of Figure 6) and no change in 
price (box 1) in Figure 6.   
Figure 6 here. 
Figure 6 looks complex at first blush but examining a few paths in model signals that 
such isomorphic models are easy-to-grasp.  The shortest path in Figure 6 appears at the top of 
Figure 7—makes no change in our (X) price if the competitor’s (O) price remains the same as 
our price.  Price increases are less complex than price decreases in this model because the market 
has few competitors and demand is inelastic; consequently if O increases its price, then X can 
increase price and profits for both will increase.  Thus, the second path in Figure 7, as appearing 
in Figure 6, includes boxes 1-2-3-4-5 for such a price increase by O and then by X.   
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Price decreases in Figure 6 and 7 are more complex than price increases because firm X 
wants to limit the possibility of a price war between X and Y.  Additional antecedent conditions 
are activated for price decreases that do not appear for price increases—such as information on 
the market shares for O and X in the local and nearby markets (boxes 9 and 10 in Figure 6).  This 
point illustrates the eighth tenet. 
Figure 7 here. 
 8.  Causal asymmetry occurs:  the explanations for price increases are not the mirror 
opposites of the explanations for price decreases—different complex configurations 
sometimes having different simple antecedent conditions occur for different outcomes in 
behavioral pricing. 
Fiss (2011), Ragin (2008), and Woodside (2013) all stress the reality of causal 
asymmetry. “While a correlational understanding of causality implies causal symmetry because 
correlations tend to be symmetric. For instance, if one were to model the inverse of high 
performance, then the results of a correlational analysis would be unchanged, except for the sign 
of the coefficients. However, a causal understanding of necessary and sufficient conditions is 
causally asymmetric—that is, the set of causal conditions leading to the presence of the outcome 
may frequently be different from the set of conditions leading to the absence of the outcome” 
(Fiss 2011, p. 394).  
Such findings in behavioral pricing as in Figure 1 by Woodside and Wilson (2000 and 
Figure 6 by Morgenroth (1964) and Howard and Morgenroth (1968) support the causal 
asymmetry stance for theory development and theory testing. Relying solely on symmetric 
testing tools such as MRA and structural equation modeling does not reflect the reality of 
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asymmetric relationships in behavioral pricing.  As Gigerenzer (1991) stresses, tools shape 
theory as well as how a researcher goes about analyzing data.  Tools and theory are necessary to 
use that support consistent findings of causal asymmetry as well as equifinality and configural 
complexity (i.e., heterogeneity) in relationships among antecedent conditions and outcomes of 
interest—such as specific price-points and price increases/decreases. 
 9.  From a behavioral pricing perspective, two or more participants engage in interactions 
involving setting a specific price-point resulting in a sale/purchase. 
Behavioral pricing theory recognizes that B2B price setting usually involves multiple 
participants influencing the selection and calibration of antecedents in the pricing process.  In the 
Morgenroth (1964) study for example, Figure 6 shows three persons are involved in setting 
price:  the pricing manager, the district sales officer, and the pricing analyst. A set price is 
frequently negotiation between the marketer and customer.  The customer frequently includes 
multiple-parties in B2B contexts as well (Woodside and Samuel, 1981).   
 10.  Price setting frequently involved a series of feedback loops in real-life contexts.  
Formal meetings often occur in negotiating annual contracts among manufacturers buying 
component parts and informal meetings both precede and follow these formal meetings.  
Woodside and Samuel (1981) provide a marketing-purchasing participant observation 
study that confirms this tenth tenet.  Their study includes a decision systems analysis (DSA) 
showing several feedback loops in the negotiations processes involving centralized purchasing 
office and various plant-level purchasing officers and well as company-wide purchasing 
committees negotiating with global suppliers.  The use of DSA is a useful precursor tool for the 
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creation of more formal ethnographic decision tree models and the use of fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis. 
The Informant (Eichenwald, 2001) is viewable correctly as a report on a marketing 
anthropological study of behavioral pricing by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI).  The study includes in-depth reporting on several (in this case, illegal) meetings of 
competing manufacturers jointly setting prices globally for agricultural-related products with 
several feedback loops in discussions of the same issues.   
The FBI study employed a mixed-methods design.  Along with unobtrusively (secretly) 
filming these price-setting meetings and recording verbal exchanges occurring during the 
meetings, the FBI analyzed thousands of pricing-fixing documents from several years, and 
completed multiple rounds of interviews with a participant observer (the informant).  The result 
is a treasure trove that appears to support the tenth tenet—and all tenets of the general theory of 
behavioral pricing;  this conclusion needs formal testing via a separate study that compares data 
from the FBI case with the behavioral pricing and classic microeconomic pricing theory. 
LIMITATIONS 
 The intention here does not include a complete exposition of the general theory of 
behavioral pricing.  While Woodside, Schpektor, and Xia (2013) provide direct comparisons of 
theory and findings using symmetric versus asymmetric tools (e.g., MRA versus QCA), they do 
so for a field experiment focusing on pricing in a consumer goods context and not a B2B context.  




The paper’s title may appear to claim too much given that the evidence is limited in 
support of the general theory. However, the presentation here focuses on developing the theory 
and to call for the use of marketing and consumer anthropological studies focusing on the tenets 
of behavioral pricing.  One objective for the study here is to encourage additional research and 
literature reviews on behavioral pricing topics to both confirm and extend the core tenets of the 
theory.   
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Famously, Kotler (1967, p. 1) pronounced, “Marketing decisions must he made in the 
context of insufficient information about processes that are dynamic, nonlinear, lagged, 
stochastic, interactive, and downright difficult.  Kotler’s perspective is relevant to pricing 
decisions and customers’ responses to specific price points as well as to advancing knowledge in 
behavioral pricing.   
Consequently, research on issues involving pricing decision processes and outcomes in 
industrial marketing contexts requires the use of methods that go beyond arms-length surveys 
using fixed-point scales.  The Morgenroth (1964), Howard and Morgenroth (1968) and the 
Woodside and Wilson (2000) studies included multiple face-to-face interviews with multiple 
participants in the pricing decision processes, document analysis of several cases (decisions), and 
in the study by Woodside and Wilson (2000) interviews with customers as well as members of 
the industrial marketing firm.  The data analysis benefitted by the use of asymmetric analytical 
tools as McClelland (1998) and Ragin propose (2008).  The findings support the tenets of the 
general theory of behavioral pricing as described in the present article. 
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One Antecedent Condition is Rarely Sufficient in Associating with a High or Low Outcome 
Score 
Reviewing the tenets of the theory and empirical findings offers strategic insights for 
both marketers (M) and customers (C).  An insight for both M and C that follows from the first 
tenet:  very large customer size alone is insufficient for offering or receiving price-points lower 
than the average price point for all customers.  B2B customers need to call attention to their size 
when aggressively pursuing a low price-point.   
Decision-Makers Rarely Use All Available Information in All Real-Life 
An insight for M from the second tenet:  different information streams relevant for 
different customer segments results in modifications to marketing strategy designs for these 
different customer segments.  Customers can be segmented by a combination of size and the 
decision processes that they enact.  For C: what works for big customers in the industry in 
gaining favored price treatment with suppliers is unlikely to work with small customers.  Small 
customers will need to enact decision processes relevant for their size to gain favored treatment 
from suppliers. 
Decision-Makers do not Tradeoff High Accuracy for Low effort but Create and Use 
Algorithms 
Woodside and Wilson (2000) describe purchasing executives reporting the use of 
compensatory decision rules for information gathering purposes but not when making actual 
choices among suppliers and their responses to RFQs—buyers use algorithms.  Their conscious 
explication of these algorithms is likely to be a valuable exercise in learning how well the 
algorithms are serving to reach their buying objectives.  For M, learning buyers’ algorithms-in-
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use will likely impact how M designs RFQ responses and the effectiveness of these responses in 
gaining share-of-business from the customers.    
Learning Necessary but Insufficient Conditions (NBICs) 
 M and C are likely not to be consciously aware of all relevant necessary but insufficient 
conditions affecting the setting of price and responses to price-points.  The in-depth study of 
multiple cases using the long interview method is likely a necessary requirement for uncovering 
such information—such was the case in learning the seemingly trivial information that not all 
customers were aware of all three national manufacturers of the chemical purchasing 
requirements in the study by Woodside and Wilson (2000).  
Prices Vary Considerably for Different Customers in the Same Industry but in Different 
Complex Configurations-in-Use by their Industrial Suppliers 
 Many industrial buyers would likely be surprised by the wide variation in prices for the 
same manufacturing commodities in the chemical industry in Woodside and Wilson’s (2000) 
study.  The low price among all customers was one-tenth of the highest prices that some 
customers were paying for the same products.  Part, but not all, of this price variance would 
relate to costs in servicing large versus small customer accounts.  Small-order customers are at a 
considerable disadvantage in attempting to negotiate price reductions.  A share of large 
customers would benefit from an increase in their aggressive in negotiating price reductions.  
The cases where large customers were too aggressive for the manufacturer to comply with 
requests for additional price reductions and additional add-on benefits (shipments with very low 




Behavioral pricing modeling and testing has been around a while now but still is a mouse 
next to the dominating elephant of symmetrical theory and testing approaches in pricing 
research.  The availability of behavioral pricing studies is spotty in comparison to the plethora of 
studies by authors adopting a combination of net effects, finality, and causal symmetry stance.  
The principle objective of this paper is to generate the start-up of continuing behavioral pricing 
research that provides an annual stream of useful studies capturing heterogeneity, realism, and 
accurate predictive—not only fit—validity. 
The intention is to present a set of tenets that together offers a new reality-based 
behavioral pricing theory that has much promise in describing, explaining, and predicting price-
related decisions and actions by marketers and buyers. The set of tenets itself includes a 
configuration of theory and tools.   
Table 1 here. 
Table 1 is a summary of comparisons of the assumptions and perspectives of 
microeconomics and the dominant logic theory toward pricing and decision-making (e.g., 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nicholson, 2011; Perloff, 2004) versus the behavioral 
theory of pricing for B2B products and services.  The central point in considering the 
comparisons in Table 1 is that while microeconomic theory and the dominant logic of research 
on decision making are elegant and frequently inaccurate, the perspectives and assumptions of 
behavioral pricing theory are messy and frequently accurate. The general theory of behavioral 




Gladwin (1989), Morgenroth (1964), Howard and Morgenroth (1968), van Maanen 
(1978), Van Someren, Barnard, and Sandberg (1994), Vyas and Woodside (1984), Woodside and 
Samuel (1989), Woodside (2010), and Woodside, Pattinson, and Montgomery (2012) offer 
details and examples for collecting data from decision participants on their perceiving 
information, sense-making, assessing issues, and choice-making processes in natural contexts; 
these sources also discuss the collection of documents and data from direct observations of 
participants’ actions in natural contexts.  The blessings from such data collection and handling 
include the combination of verbal and written data and process information relevant to specific 
contexts that the use of fixed-point (e.g., 1 to5 or 1 to 7 valuations) surveys cannot provide; also, 
invariable, participants blurt-out information during moments in think aloud data collection 
procedures that they would never report in written survey responses—especially when the 
participants are interviewed on two or more occasions.  Regarding this last point, Chris Rock 
The bane of management ethnographic research is the great amount of effort and time 
necessary for implementing field data collection.  However, the data collection of 5 to 100+ such 
case studies enables useful construction of isomorphic models—models that support Kotler’s 
(1967) perspective of the features of real-life decision processes in ways that symmetric models 
(structural equation models) using fixed-point responses cannot do.   
The data collection of an additional 5 to 100+ management ethnographic cases enables 
the testing for predictive validity of algorithms (i.e., complex configurations consisting of two or 
more simple antecedent conditions) within the isomorphic models created from the first set of 
data.  McClelland (1998), Morgenroth (1964), and Howard and Morgenroth (1968) illustrate 
such tests for predictive validity; their findings include high predictive validities (e.g., r’s > 0.90) 
between predictions and observed outcomes.   
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The blessings of collecting fixed-point survey data include the relative ease of data 
collection and ease of testing models using symmetric methods (MRA and SEM).  The banes 
include requiring participants to convert what they think they know into scaled responses (the 
failure to collect real-life, naturally-occurring, data), the absence of contextual information, 
usually the absence of confirmations of facts and procedures learned by going into the field and 
comparing documents and observations with verbal and/or fix-point scaled responses, and the 
circumspect nature of any open-ended written responses by respondents to survey questions.   
While surveys using fix-point scales followed by symmetric model-building and testing 
may provide useful information on participants’ evaluations of the quality of procedures and 
outcomes, such studies offer inadequate information in describing and understanding the nitty-
gritty steps in the processes and provide models with low fit validity—and low predictive 
validity (on the rare occasions when these studies include predictive validities).  The implicit 
suggestion by Kotler (1967) and the explicit suggestions by Mintzberg (1979) and Woodside 
(2013) to move beyond fixed-point surveys coupled with symmetric testing to ethnographic 
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Figure 1 
Summary pricing, and sales negotiations, decision model for BIGCHEM chemical based on customer decision profiles 
Source:  Adapted from Figure 6 in Woodside and Wilson (2000, p. 363). 









3. Is customer focused on 
achieving cost reduction 
(lowering price for new 
contract period) 
Yes 4. Will customer 
single-source 













8.Is customer receiving a 
competitive bid one cent below 
our current price 
Yes 
1. Set price one cent 
below competitor 
that BIGCHEM 
refuses to lose 
customer’s business 
No  
6. Is customer 




9. Will customer 
sole-source if price 








7. Will customer 
use 50-50 split of 
business? 













price point set 
in bid proposal; 
adjust price in 






at a profitable 














Customer price-lowering aggressiveness 
0.0                                                       0.5                                                           1.0     Calibrated scale 
Final (low) price point 
(negative calibrated 










































XY Plot of Pricing Antecedent Condition for a Necessary but Not Sufficient Condition 
Note.  Each dot is a case, that is, a customer firm, plotted on the customer’s price-lowering aggressiveness 
and the final price quoted to the customer by the marketer’s firm. Data  (n = 80) and plot are from additional  
analysis of marketer’s responses to customers’ requests for proposals (RFQs) and follow-up documents 
of customers’ responses to marketer’s proposals from the study by Woodside and Wilson (2000). 
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Complex antecedent condition the is sufficient but not necessary:  
K•S•A where K= key account;  S = willingness to singe-source; 




Case 11, for K•S•A  
Note.  Customers with high membership scores (≥ 0.8) on K•S•A receive very low final price quotes with the  
exception of case 11.  The explanation for case 11 relates to the title of Van Maanen (1978), “The Asshole.”   
Case 11 is super-aggressive in attempting to lower price.  Assuming that case 11to be the only asshole (H),  
the membership scores on not an asshole (~H) for case 11 equals 0.0.  Creating a configuration that incudes  
K•S•A•~H serves to shift the position of case 11 on the X axis to the far left. Thus, a very complex antecedent  
condition is necessary to include case 11 to result in very high consistency.       
• Case 11, for K•S•A~H    
Figure 4 
Examples of Industrial Solvents Conditional Pricing in Alternative Contexts            
 
            Configuration 
(Alternative path/Boolean expression)                                             Conditional Statement                                                                   
 
                        A 
Path:  1 →2 → 3 → 4 = 13                                          Lowering-price-strategy:  If a key (K) account customer who is focused on cost 
reductions Boolean:  K•R•S ≤ (Price ≤ -1.0)              aggressively on lowering-price (A)  and is willing to single-source (S),  then price 
                more than 35% below the annual average price. 
 
                       B      
Path: 1→3→6→9 = 11                                                High-price-increase strategy:  If key (K) account customer who is not focused on 
Boolean:  K•~A•~V ≤ 11                 aggressively (~A) on  price reductions and not focused on cost avoidance (~V), then   
                 increase price 10% above the current price that K is now paying.  (A rare context.) 
 
                      C 
Path:  (1→2→5→8 = 10) →15                                   Signaling competitor pricing for small but important customer: If customer is 
Boolean:  (~K•S•C ≤  10) • 15)               not a key account (~K) but does single source (S), but has received an RFQ response 
                from a competitor (C), then price 1¢ below competitor’s bid; observe customer’s     
                response. 
  
                      D 
Path:  1→2→5→8 = 11               Highest-price-increase strategy:  If customer is not a key account (~) but does single 
Boolean:  ~K•S•~C ≤ 11              source (S) and has not received a competitor’s response (~C) to an RFQ, then increase 
               the price above the already high price by 10% that this customer is now paying. 
 
                      E 
Path:  (1→2→3→4→7 = 14) → 15                           Competitor-pairing pricing:  If customer is a key account (K) and is focused on cost 
Boolean:  (K•R•~S•L = 14) • 15             reductions (R) but is unwilling to single-source (~S) but will split business 50-50 (L), 
               then set new price equal to competitor’s price and watch competitor’s response. 
R = Customer price aggressiveness? 
Very low                  Moderate                  Very High 
S =  
Customer willingness 


























Price Increase and Decrease Points in Standard Units (Z-scores) with 
Cylinders Indicating Number of Customers (not Volume of Business) 
Notes.  Most customers accept price increases.  High scores in all three antecedent conditions (K•R•S) 
sufficient for lowest price point.  Focusing on the overall average price change (Z = + 0.2) is misleading 
because specific configurations of antecedent conditions associate with a specific price point.  
A B 
 C                                                           D  
E                                                          F 
 G                                                            H 
Figure 6  
Wholesale Pricing of Petroleum  
(Source: Morgenroth, 1964, p. 19)  
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Key.  P = price; t – time, at present;  PA=price analyst; r = retail; (t+l) = time, subsequent to considering price change; w = Wholesale;  
Q = Quantity; ≠ - is not equal to; or is different from; x – our company;  l = local market, wherein price change is being considered    
is greater than; o->  is other major competitors in local market; n= nearby market with funnel influences; ↑= raise price 
o = other major competitor initiator ;  DSO = district sales office; ↓ - drop price 
no 
Figure 7 
Example Heuristics in the Wholesale Petroleum Pricing Model 
Source:  Morgenroth (1964, p. 23) 
 
Alternate Route   English Equivalent 
A. 1 – 2 – No – 1   Watch Others’ Wholesale Local price.  Is it different from the Company’s price?  If 
“No”, watch. 
 
B. 1 – 2 Yes – 3 Yes – 4 Yes – 5  Another raises his Local Wholesale Price. District Sales office (DSO) says to raise 
                                                price so the Company meets the price 
 
C. 1 – 2 – Yes – 3- Yes – 4 – Yes – 5            Another raises his Local Wholesale price.  DSO says not to raise price, but Price Analyst 
                                                                       (PA) believes others may follow, so Company meets the price. 
 
D. 1 – 2 – Yes – 4 – No – 6 – No – 7           Another raises his price.  DSO says not to raise price.  PA is dubious.  The company waits 
      No – 1                                                      24-48 hours.  The other competitors follow up, so the Company meets the price. 
 
E. 1 – 2 – Yes – 3 – Yes – 4 – No – 6           Same ad D, but others do not follow, so Company watches market. 
      - No  – 7 - 1  
 
F. 1 – 2- Yes – 3 – Yes – 9 – 10 – Yes – 5   Another drops his Local Wholesale Price.  DSO says to follow down.  The other’s local 
                                                                      market share is larger than the Company’s local market share. The company’s local  
                                                                      market volume is larger than its nearby market volume.  The Company meets the price. 
 
G. 1 – 2 – Yes – 3- No – 8 – Yes – 9          Same as F, except that the Company’s nearby market volume is larger than its local market 
      - Yes- 10 – 11 – Yes 5                            local market volume.  The nearby market wholesale price is below the local wholesale 
                                                                     price, so the Company meets the price. 
 
H. 1 – 2 Yes – No – 8 – Yes – 9 – Yes       Same as G, except that the Company’s Local Wholesale Price is below its nearby market 
      10 – No – 11 – No – 12 – 1                   wholesale price.  This will funnel the larger market, so the Company does not change price. 
 
Table 1 
Comparison of Perspectives of Microeconomics/Dominant Logic 
and the General Theory of Behavioral Pricing 
 
        Concept      Microeconomics/Dominant Logic           General Theory of Behavioral Pricing 
 
1. Context?   Ignore            Embrace 
 
2. XY relationship assumption? Symmetric            Asymmetric 
 
3. Stance toward complexity? Dismiss (“all else equal”)           Capture, report 
 
4. Research focus?  Variables; statistical models          Cases; isomorphic algorithms 
 
5. Focus of findings?  Net effects; fit validity only                                 Configurations; fit and predictive validity 
 
6. Theoretical stance?  Rationality           Bounded rationality 
 
7. View of decision-maker?  Biased; mistake prone          Biased; prone toward high accuracy 
 
8.  Decision-maker?  Individual                                                                Group (e.g., “buying center”) 
 
9. Directionality  Ignore           Feedback loops 
 
10. Stance toward information? Use all information available          Use all information necessary 
 
11. Foundation for analysis?                          Matrix algebra                                                        Boolean algebra 
 
12.  Stance toward markets?                          Many buyers  and sellers                                        Few buyers and sellers 
 
13.  Weighting attributes?  Yes          No 
 
14.  Firm’s principal objective? Maximize profits         Context-bound satisficing profits    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
